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Abstract We revisit the jungle economy of Piccione and Rubinstein (Econ J
117(July):883–896, 2007) in which the allocation of resources is driven by coercion. In
this economy the unique equilibrium satisfies lexicographic maximization. We show
that relaxing the assumptions on consumption sets and preferences slightly, allocations
other than lexicographic maximizers can be jungle equilibria. We attribute this result
to single unilateral taking where a stronger agent takes goods from only one weaker
agent. Once multiple unilateral takings are introduced, we show that jungle equilibria
coincide with lexicographic maximization under weak assumptions. However, we also
present examples of equilibria that are Pareto inefficient, where voluntary gift giving
by stronger agents is needed to achieve Pareto efficiency and even voluntary trade has
a role in the jungle.
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1 Introduction
While the competitive market is based on voluntary exchange, the jungle economy
is characterized by coercive exchange where stronger agents can take goods from
weaker agents. The analysis of the jungle economy provides a complement to the
Walrasian equilibrium model with which it shares existence and welfare properties
(Piccione and Rubinstein 2007, P&R hereafter). Embedded within the rich tradition of
social contract theory following Hobbes and Locke, it facilitates a better understanding
of the allocation of initial endowments, the exogenous primitive of the competitive
equilibrium model. P&R propose a stylized model in which coercion governs the
exchange of resources in the jungle. Coercion is driven by the agents’ preferences over
bounded consumption sets and power relations that are described by an exogenous
ranking of agents according to their strength. Weaker agents concede to stronger agents
without engaging in costly conflict. The jungle economy mirrors the standard model
of an exchange economy. The exogenous distribution of power in the jungle is the
counterpart of the distribution of initial endowments in the market.
In a jungle equilibrium, a stronger agent no longer wants to take goods from any
weaker agent nor from a pile of common goods, that no other agent holds. P&R specify
certain conditions on consumption sets and preferences under which a unique and
Pareto efficient jungle equilibrium exists.1 This jungle equilibrium coincides with the
unique lexicographic maximum in which all of the economy’s resources are initially
common goods and stronger agents take from the pile of common goods before weaker
agents can take.
It is tempting to conclude from P&R’s intriguing analysis that exactly the particular
strength relation assumed in their paper constitutes the main driving force behind the
final distribution of resources in the jungle. However, this conclusion is somewhat
premature. The goal of our paper is to provide a more nuanced view on the inter-
action of strength, preferences and holdings behind the jungle equilibrium concept.
Intentionally, we do not deviate from P&R’s strength relation throughout the paper.
In our analysis we assume that initial holdings are distributed over the agents rather
than being available as common goods, as is the case in P&R. More generally, a stronger
agent may take from any weaker agent or from the (remaining) pile of common goods.
Under P&R’s assumptions on consumption sets and preferences, initial holdings are
irrelevant for lexicographic maximization. The intuition is that each single taking
improves the taker’s welfare and thus only an allocation where the stronger agents are
either satisfied or have acquired all goods can be an equilibrium. The initial distribution
1 These assumptions are compact and convex consumption sets and smooth, strongly monotone and strictly
convex preferences.
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of resources among agents in jungle economies is relevant only to determine from
whom a stronger agent takes.
However, once we relax the assumptions of strong monotonicity and strict convexity
of preferences assumed by P&R, the distribution of initial holdings matters. A single
taking may not improve the taker’s welfare such that an inefficient allocation can
‘survive’ as an equilibrium. Imagine an example of a jungle economy with a strong
agent and two weaker agents, where the former holds Leontief preferences over pairs
of shoes and currently holds no shoes. Suppose one weaker agent holds a left shoe
and the other holds a right shoe. Since getting only a left shoe or only a right shoe
does not increase the strong agent’s utility, the strong agent will not take if restricted
to a single taking. Therefore, the jungle is in equilibrium.2 In such a case the jungle
equilibrium does not satisfy lexicographic maximization, nor is it Pareto efficient.
As this example illustrates, the jungle equilibrium concept fails to recognize that
the stronger agent can gain by coercing both weaker agents even if each single taking
does not improve the strong agent’s welfare. We show that if we include multiple
takings into the equilibrium concept, jungle equilibria coincide with lexicographic
maximization under rather weak assumptions.3
Furthermore, with the use of an example, we derive a continuum of equilibria in
which the strongest agent holds goods in excess of her satiation point. As the strongest
agent has no incentive to dispose of excess goods, she may withhold them from weaker
agents, who cannot take them. This withholding of goods is Pareto inefficient and only
voluntary gift giving by stronger agents can remove this inefficiency. With another
example, we show that even voluntary gift giving may sometimes be insufficient to
achieve Pareto efficiency. Then, voluntary trade is needed.
These examples demonstrate why we believe that our analysis adds to a better
understanding of the crucial assumptions underlying jungle economies. Pareto effi-
ciency in the jungle is not a result of coercion alone. Interestingly, depending on the
kind of preferences present in the jungle, voluntary gift giving and voluntary trade,
behavior that is in sharp contrast to coercion, is needed to keep the jungle efficient.
Thus, our conclusions diverge strikingly from P&R, who see no role for gift giving
and trade in the jungle.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents a formal account of a jungle economy
with initial holdings of which P&R’s jungle economy is a special case. Section 3
investigates lexicographic maximization and provides two examples to motivate our
analysis. The jungle equilibrium with multiple unilateral takings is investigated in
Sect. 4. The subtle role of withholding, voluntary gift giving and voluntary trade is
discussed in Sect. 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 For the sake of the argument, assume the weaker agents cannot take from each other.
3 These assumptions are non-empty, compact and strictly comprehensive consumption sets and complete,
transitive and continuous preferences.
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2 Preliminaries
We consider a finite set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} of size n ≥ 2 and a finite number
m ≥ 1 of goods that are present in positive quantities. We refer to zi as the holdings
and to xi as the consumption of agent i ∈ N . Consumption is feasible when xi  zi
for all i ∈ N .4 The consumption set of agent i is denoted Ci ⊂ Rm+. This set is non-
empty, compact and strictly comprehensive, i.e., for all zi ∈ Ci and zˆi ∈ Rm+ such
that zˆi ≤ zi it holds that zˆi lies in the interior of Ci . As in P&R, an agent’s holdings
(and consumption) cannot exceed her consumption set. The preference relation of
agent i on Ci , denoted i , is complete, transitive and continuous. Its symmetric and
asymmetric parts are denoted ∼i and i respectively.
An allocation z = (z1, . . . , zn, zn+1) assigns holdings to each agent in N , while
zn+1 ∈ Rm+ indicates the bundle of common goods that is held by none of the agents.
The economy’s total endowment equals ω˜ ∈ Rm+. Unlike P&R we allow that initial
holdings are allocated to the agents. Initial holdings are defined as the feasible allo-
cation ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn, ωn+1). An allocation z is feasible when ∑n+1i=1 zi = ω˜ and
zi ∈ Ci for all i ∈ N .5 A feasible allocation z is Pareto efficient if there does not exist
another feasible allocation zˆ such that zˆ i z for all i ∈ N and zˆ i z for at least one
i ∈ N .
Coercion governs the exchange of goods in the jungle economy and it is driven by
the agents’ preferences and strengths. The order of the agents reflects their strength.
As in the jungle economy of P&R, the strength relation is extreme. The strongest agent
of any pair of agents has the power to take everything that the weaker agent possesses,
while the weaker agent cannot take anything from the stronger agent.6 The agents in
N are ordered such that agent 1 is stronger than agent 2, who is stronger than agent 3,
and so on. Thus i < j implies that i is stronger than j .
Thus far, we have defined an economy driven by coercion as a tuple
〈
N , {Ci ,i }i∈N ,
ω〉. This tuple extends the jungle economy of P&R by introducing the initial holdings
ω. Furthermore, in the jungle economy of P&R each Ci is a convex set and prefer-
ences in the jungle economy are strongly monotone and strictly convex.7 We relax
this assumption later on.
An agent’s feasible consumption is the set of bundles that this agent is able to
reach from her own and the weaker agents’ current holdings. It is convenient to define
yi, j  z j as agent i’s unilateral takings that result from a single coercive exchange
between agents i and j > i .
4 Vector inequalities: we write a  b if for all vector components k we have ak ≤ bk ; a ≤ b if for all
vector components k we have ak ≤ bk and there exist at least one component for which the inequality is
strict; and a < b if for all vector components k we have ak < bk . Furthermore, ⊆ denotes a subset and ⊂
a strict subset.
5 We include zi ∈ Ci into the definition of feasible allocations because technically speaking agent i’s
preferences on Rm+\Ci are undefined.
6 The interpretation is that the weaker agent concedes to the stronger agent and does not initiate a costly
conflict knowing it will be lost for sure.
7 In fact, monotone and strictly convex preferences imply strongly monotone preferences. However, for
the sake of consistency with P&R, we keep referring to the preferences in the jungle as strongly monotone
and strictly convex.
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As a benchmark, we adopt the notion of jungle equilibrium of P&R in which stability
against unilateral takings by stronger agents is the key idea.
Definition 1 A jungle equilibrium is a feasible allocation z for which there does
not exist an ordered pair of agents i, j , unilateral takings yi, j and a feasible bundle
zˆi = zi + yi, j ∈ Ci such that zˆi i zi .
Note that the definition of a jungle equilibrium does not refer to the initial allocation
which may assign goods to the agents or, as in P&R, to the pile of common goods.
In what follows, besides coercion, we will also consider gift giving and trade in
the jungle (cfr. Sect. 5). We define unilateral gift giving of good k from agent i to







k . We define bilateral trade between agents i and j of goods k and


















In the jungle economy of P&R, where the initial allocation is just a pile of common
goods, a jungle equilibrium can be obtained when agents take in the order of strength
(P&R, Proposition 1). We refer to the result of such a procedure as a lexicographic
maximizer, which we define as follows:
Definition 2 A lexicographic maximizer is a feasible allocation z¯ such that for every
agent i ∈ N it holds that z¯i i zi for all zi ∈
{
x ∈ Ci |x  ω˜ − ∑i−1j=1 z¯ j
}
.
It is useful to denote the set of lexicographic maximizers by Z¯ , i.e. the set of
allocations z¯ that satisfy Definition 2. Assuming strongly monotone and strictly convex
preferences, the jungle economy has a unique lexicographic maximum and hence a
unique jungle equilibrium (P&R, Proposition 3).
However, when the assumption of strongly monotone and strictly convex prefer-
ences of P&R is relaxed to monotone and convex preferences, to allow for Leontief
preferences, there may no longer be a unique lexicographic maximizer as Example 1
illustrates.
Example 1 Consider an economy with two agents and two goods. The economy’s
total resources are ω˜ = (2, 1). The agents’ consumption sets are identical and given
by C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R2+|x  ω˜
}
for simplicity. For i = 1, 2, agent i’s best element
of i on Ci maximizes the Leontief preferences min {zi1, zi2
}
. It is easy to see that
allocations
ω1 = (1, 1) , ω2 = (1, 0) and common goods ω3 = (0, 0) and
ω′1 = (1, 1) , ω′2 = (0, 0) and common goods ω′3 = (1, 0)
8 For the purpose of this paper it is sufficient to consider trade of two goods only. We therefore abstain
from giving a more general definition of trade.
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both satisfy Definition 2 and are both jungle equilibria according to Definition 1
because neither agent 1 nor agent 2 can gain from unilateral takings.
An agent with Leontief preferences may not have an incentive to take a good,
because a larger bundle, even though it belongs to her consumption set, is not neces-
sarily better.
Moreover, there may exist jungle equilibria that are not lexicographic maximizers.
Example 2 illustrates this argument.
Example 2 Consider an economy with two agents and three goods. The economy’s
total resources are ω˜ = (1, 1, 1). The agents’ consumption sets are identical and given
by C1 = C2 = {x ∈ R3+|x  ω˜
}
for simplicity. For i = 1, 2, agent i’s best element of
i on Ci maximizes the Leontief preferences min {zi1, zi2, zi3
}
. For all allocations ω,
the unique lexicographic maximizer z¯ is given by z¯1 = ω˜ and z¯2 = z¯3 = 0. However,
for α ∈ [0, 1],
ω1 = (1, α, α) , ω2 = (0, 1 − α, 0) and common goods ω3 = (0, 0, 1 − α)
form an equilibrium according to Definition 1 because neither agent 1 nor agent 2 can
gain from unilateral takings. For α < 1, it differs from the lexicographic maximum
and it is Pareto inefficient because z1 = (α, α, α), z2 = (1 − α, 1 − α, 1 − α) and
z3 = (0, 0, 0) is welfare improving. Besides permutations, no other equilibria exist.
There are two intriguing issues about this example. First, the jungle equilibrium
concept fails to recognize that stronger agents might evaluate the aggregate of multiple
unilateral takings instead of a single unilateral taking. In the next section, we introduce
multiple unilateral takings in the jungle. Second, for initial holdings ω1 = (1, α, α),
the amount 1 − α of good 1 does not contribute additional welfare to agent 1 and
this agent is indifferent between keeping it or disposing it. This observation gives a
glimpse of the issue of withholding, which we discuss in Sect. 5.
Finally, note that unused resources can also occur in an equilibrium of an exchange
economy. As Randon and Simmons (2017) explain for a famous example in Scarf
(1960), such cases may result from unequally distributed initial holdings and rigid
(Leontief) preferences.
4 The jungle economy with multiple unilateral takings
In this section, we include multiple unilateral takings into the jungle equilibrium
concept and show that all jungle equilibria with multiple unilateral takings are lexico-
graphic maximizers.
Formally, an agent i does not only consider a single unilateral taking from a weaker
agent j , as in a jungle equilibrium, but rather considers multiple unilateral takings
from some or all weaker agents and from the pile of common goods. We denote agent
i’s multiple unilateral takings by the tuple yi = (yi,i+1, . . . , yi,n+1). Given allocation
z, agent i’s multiple unilateral takings yi are feasible if
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i, j ∈ Ci and yi, j  z j for all j ∈ {i + 1, . . . , n + 1}.
We define the jungle equilibrium with multiple unilateral takings as follows:
Definition 3 A jungle equilibrium with multiple unilateral takings is a feasible allo-
cation z such that there does not exist an agent i ∈ N and feasible multiple unilateral
takings yi for which zi + ∑n+1j=i+1 yi, j i zi .
Then, the following equivalence holds:
Theorem 1 Each lexicographic maximizer z¯ ∈ Z¯ is a jungle equilibrium with multiple
unilateral takings and vice versa.
Proof The result follows from the following equivalences: z¯ ∈ Z¯ ⇔ for each i ∈ N
and feasible multiple unilateral takings yi it holds that z¯i i z¯i + ∑n+1j=i+1 yi, j ⇔
for each i ∈ N there does not exist feasible multiple unilateral takings yi such that
z¯i + ∑n+1j=i+1 yi, j i z¯i ⇔ z¯ is a jungle equilibrium with multiple unilateral takings.unionsq
Note that Z¯ is non-empty and therefore a jungle equilibrium with multiple unilateral
takings always exists. Recall that consumption sets are non-empty, compact and strictly
comprehensive and preferences are complete, transitive and continuous. Therefore, the
assumptions for Theorem 1 are rather weak.
5 Unilateral gift giving and bilateral trade
In principle, an agent is not forced to consume all her holdings and may freely dispose
or waste some of the resources available to her. In the jungle economy of P&R agents
may freely dispose goods. This is captured by the assumption that the consumption set
is comprehensive. But given strongly monotone preferences in the jungle economy of
P&R, all agents consume their holdings in equilibrium. Example 2, however, illustrates
that the distinction between holdings and consumption is more subtle and can matter.
Holdings that are not consumed are withheld from other agents in the economy. We
now investigate withholding of goods in equilibria with multiple unilateral takings by
means of two additional examples.
The first of these is similar in spirit to Example 2 but differs in that a continuum
of jungle equilibria with multiple takings are Pareto inefficient due to withholding, a
phenomenon that is not present in Example 2.
Example 3 Consider an economy with two agents and two goods. The economy’s
total resources are ω˜ = (2, 1). The agents’ consumption sets are identical and given
by C1 = C2 = X = {x ∈ R2+|x  ω˜
}
for simplicity. Agent 1’s best element of 1






and agent 2’s best element




z22. For all allocations ω, the set of lexicographic
maximizers Z¯ is given by
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∈ C1 × C2 × X | z¯1 = (1 + ε, 1) ,
z¯2 = (1 − ε, 0) , z¯3 = (0, 0) , ε ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
This set coincides with the set of jungle equilibria with multiple unilateral takings.
For ε > 0, the lexicographic maximum is Pareto inefficient because z1 = (1, 1), z2 =
(1, 0) and z3 = (0, 0) is welfare improving. So, only the lexicographic maximizer
corresponding to ε = 0 is Pareto efficient. Withholding can be said to occur whenever
ε > 0.
The economic issue, left open in this paper, is whether agent 1 has an incentive
to keep or voluntarily give away her excess holdings ε > 0 of good 1. By keeping ε
of good 1, this agent withholds it from agent 2, for whom it would increase welfare.
Voluntary gift giving is needed to restore Pareto efficiency in this example.
From Example 3 it seems that only voluntary gift giving by stronger agents can
remedy Pareto inefficiency. However, in our final example we contend that this is not
necessarily true. We argue that even voluntary bilateral trade can have a role in the
jungle.
Example 4 Consider an economy with two agents and two goods. The economy’s
total resources are ω˜ = (1, 1). Agent 1’s consumption set is given by C1 ={
x ∈ R2+ | x1 + x2 ≤ 1
}
and, for simplicity, agent 2’s consumption set is given by
C2 = {x ∈ R2+|x  ω˜
}
and X = {x ∈ R2+|x  ω˜
}
. Agent 1’s best element of 1










∈ C1 × C2 × X | z¯1 = (ε, 1 − ε) ,
z¯2 = (1 − ε, ε) , z¯3 = (0, 0) , ε ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
This set coincides with the set of jungle equilibria with multiple unilateral takings
(Theorem 1). Obviously, no withholding occurs. For ε = 12 , however, the lexicographic
maximizer is Pareto inefficient because z1 = ( 12 , 12 ), z2 = ( 12 , 12 ) and z3 = (0, 0) is
welfare improving. So, only the lexicographic maximizer corresponding to ε = 12 is
Pareto efficient. It can only be reached from allocations with ε = 12 by voluntary trade
in which goods 1 and 2 are exchanged one-for-one.
As before, the economic issue remains whether agent 1 has an incentive to volun-
tarily trade with agent 2 or not.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a detailed analysis of the jungle economy as first described by
P&R. Our work can be interpreted as a sensitivity analysis regarding some crucial
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assumptions introduced by P&R. While throughout the paper we maintain the assump-
tion that stronger agents have coercive power over weaker agents, we introduce two
extensions of P&R’s benchmark model of a jungle economy. First, we allow arbitrary
initial holdings of the agents. Second, we allow agents in the jungle to have Leontief
preferences. In this case, Example 2 shows that stronger agents may not be able to
gain from a single unilateral taking even if there are feasible allocations that make the
stronger agents better off. Hence, jungle equilibria are not necessarily lexicographic
maximizers. We respond to this finding by introducing the concept of a jungle economy
with multiple unilateral takings and show that lexicographic maximization implements
jungle equilibria with multiple unilateral takings under weak assumptions. However,
Example 3 shows that a jungle equilibrium with multiple unilateral takings need not
be Pareto efficient. Stronger agents can withhold goods they do not wish to consume
from weaker agents. Only voluntary gift giving can restore Pareto efficiency in this
case. Example 4 shows that, in some non-generic cases, even voluntary bilateral trade
is necessary to achieve Pareto efficiency.
The microeconomic idea of an efficient jungle has its philosophical underpinning in
John Locke’s (1690, section 31) no-spoilage proviso. In his famous “Second Treatise
of Government” Locke argues that legitimate property rights are incompatible with
wasting resources. Locke’s second proviso that one can only privately acquire goods
from the common pool as long as “there is enough, and as good left in common for
others” (section 27) is, however, violated in the jungle.
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